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Monetary Policy in the
Conservatives’ 2015 General
Election Campaign
La politique monétaire dans la campagne législative des Conservateurs en 2015
Nathalie Champroux
1 For the outgoing Coalition government and Conservative leader and Prime Minister David
Cameron, the 2015 general election date could hardly have come at a better time from the
point  of  view  of  the  economy.  At  first  glance,  the  statistics  tended  to  show  the
government  had effectively  presided over  a  firm and balanced recovery,  leading the
country to enviable steady growth,  zero inflation,  falling unemployment and a lower
budget deficit. There was therefore hardly any doubt that the Conservatives’ campaign
would focus on this great asset. Indeed, even before the dissolution of Parliament, David
Cameron  started  communicating  a  positive  message  about  his  government’s  proven
economic competence,1 while Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne contrasted
this competence to the economic “chaos” 2 a Labour team would bring.
2 This  article  examines  how  the  Conservatives  exploited  the  United  Kingdom’s  good
economic performance in their 2015 general election campaign and, in particular, seeks
to identify the role attributed to the last five years’ monetary policy. Of course, monetary
policy  on  its  own  cannot  exclusively  account  for  Britain’s  relative  prosperity.
Nevertheless, if Osborne’s 2013 Budget speech to the House of Commons3 is to be believed,
monetary policy should be given some credit. This article is therefore interested in how
the  Conservatives  treated  this  particular  issue:  whether  they  acknowledged  the
effectiveness of the independent Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England or
whether they claimed full merit for all the factors supporting Britain’s economic success,
thus adding to the monetary policy re-politicization process observed in 2013.  It  will
focus  on  the  Conservatives’  public  electoral  campaign,  as  relayed  by  the  media  to
ordinary  citizens,  and not  on  the  specially  tailored  messages  delivered  to  specific
economic or political assemblies.
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3 The article starts with the contextualisation of the analysis. Section 1 explains how the
introduction of forward guidance in Britain in 2013 entailed a process of monetary policy
re-politicization.  Section  2  presents  an  overview  of  the  United  Kingdom’s  economic
conditions at the time of the 2015 general election, which will help readers to understand
the various arguments the Conservatives put forward in their campaign. The article then
analyses  the  campaign  itself.  Section  3  explains  the  process  which  underpinned  the
Conservatives’ decision to focus their campaign on economic aspects. Section 4 describes
the  economic  message  that  was  conveyed  and  Section  5  seeks  to  identify  more
particularly how the Conservatives dealt with monetary policy. The article finishes with
an attempt at explaining why the Conservatives chose to deal with their own monetary
policy actions in the way they did during the campaign.
 
The 2013 Process of Monetary Policy Re-Politicization
4 Most  elements  of  Britain’s  current  monetary  policy  were  introduced  by  previous
Conservative and New Labour governments. Conservative Chancellors of the Exchequer
Norman Lamont and Kenneth Clarke set up the bases of direct inflation targeting,4 just
after sterling left the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System in
September 1992. New Labour Chancellor Gordon Brown then reinforced the policy with
the Bank of England Act voted in Parliament in 1998.  A more formal framework was
established,  with  the  Treasury  being  henceforth  only  responsible  for  defining  price
stability,  while  operational  independence was  granted to  the Bank of  England.  More
explicitly,  the  Treasury  fixed  the  inflation  target5 and  the  Bank’s  Monetary  Policy
Committee (MPC) decided on the proper use of monetary policy instruments to achieve
the target in the medium term. Then, with the financial crisis that started in the summer
of 2007, Brown’s successor, Alistair Darling, agreed to gradual reductions of the Bank of
England’s base rate to close to zero percent, from December 2007 to March 2009. Finally,
Darling authorized the first waves of quantitative easing, with asset purchases totalling
£200 billion from March 2009 to January 2010.
5 Cameron’s  team  subsequently  made  their  own  particular  contributions  to  Britain’s
monetary policy framework. Osborne allowed for further quantitative easing in October
2011,  and February  and July  2012,  which  increased  the  amount  of  government  debt
purchases from £200 billion to £375 billion. In July 2012, the Treasury and the Bank of
England introduced the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS), which permitted commercial
banks and building societies to borrow more cheaply from the central bank. In turn,
households (until  January 2014 only)  and,  especially,  companies,  had easier access to
loans. In addition to these measures, the Conservative Chancellor was at the origin of the
inclusion of  forward guidance in  the  Bank of  England’s  monetary strategy.6 Osborne
appointed Mark Carney as the Governor of the Bank of England. He had headhunted
Carney from the Bank of Canada, where Carney had famously pioneered the use of the
unconventional instrument. Osborne also officially assumed the responsibility of opening
the door to the adoption of forward guidance, in the remit7 he sent to the Governor of the
Bank of England at the time of the 2013 Budget. In his Budget speech, he even presented
this adoption as the “monetary reform”8 which constituted one of the three pillars of the
reinforcement of the government’s economic plan. In reality, the adoption of forward
guidance fell short of the commentators’ expectations of a complete change in the British
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monetary policy framework. Yet Osborne’s move and speech should be remembered as
they re-politicized monetary policy in the United Kingdom.
6 To understand the re-politicization of monetary policy, it is necessary to go back to the
opposite concept of de-politicization. According to political scientist Matthew Flinders,
de-politicization happens  when “politicians  [...]  attempt  to  move  to  an  indirect  governing
relationship  and/or  seek  to  persuade  the  demos  that  they  can  no  longer  be  reasonably  held
responsible for a certain issue, policy field or specific decision.”9 As far as British monetary
policy is concerned, this phenomenon occurred with the introduction of the minimum
lending rate in 197210 and the participation of sterling in the ERM at the beginning of the
1990s.  Then,  since  1998,  when  Gordon  Brown  entrusted  the  MPC  with  formulating
monetary  policy,  British  governments  have  relinquished  their  power  over  the
manipulation of monetary policy instruments – the main instrument being the Bank base
rate, until the zero lower bound was reached in 2009.
7 But Osborne’s 2013 Budget measure and speech reversed the trend. First, the Chancellor
encompassed the government in the “we” he used to refer to the actors responsible for “
[keeping] interest rates at record lows”,11 whereas only the Bank of England could take credit
for  the  interest  rate  stability.  Second,  his  so-called  “reform”  was  more  a  slight
interference with the Bank of England’s operational independence. Indeed, Osborne did
not  act  on the government’s  prerogatives:  he neither gave a  new definition of  price
stability nor changed the target, which he could have replaced by a new target altogether
(like nominal output) or by a new inflation target rate at 3% or 4% of CPI, for example.
Instead, the Chancellor incited the MPC to adopt a new instrument. He made “clear that
the  Committee  may  wish  to issue  explicit  forward  guidance,  including  using  intermediate
thresholds”12 and  presented  the  United  States  Federal  Reserve’s  experiment  with  the
unemployment threshold as an example to follow. Even if he cautiously declared that “
whether intermediate thresholds [were] used [would] be an operational matter for the independent
MPC”,13 it  was  absolutely  clear  that  he  advocated –  and expected –  such a  use.  The
chicken-and-egg  question  will  remain  unanswered  here.  Was  Osborne  the  initial
instigator of  the adoption of  forward guidance or,  to mix metaphors,  was he simply
holding  the  magician’s  hat  for  Carney’s  rabbit?  Whatever  the  causal  direction,  the
essential point is the impression conveyed: that of the Treasury getting its hands back on
monetary policy.
 
The Economic Context of the 2015 General Election
8 In 2013, the Chancellor’s directions were understood as a clear recourse to monetary
policy to rescue the economy in the context of asphyxiating fiscal austerity. To be fair,
Osborne did not convey this precise message. Rather he presented “credible” fiscal policy
as a help which “creat[ed] the space for”, or “securely anchored”,14 active monetary policy.
But he gave monetary policy “a full role in supporting the economy”,15 while this role was not
linked in any way to efforts to reduce budget deficits, even in the long term. There was an
echo of the Medium Term Financial Strategy of the early 1980s, so much so that the
supply  side  reforms  of  the  government’s  plan  were  not  much  remarked  upon  by
commentators.
9 As  it  turned  out,  by  2015,  the  statistics  tended  to  confirm  the  effectiveness  of  the
government’s  plan and its  reinforcement  performed in 2013,  as  regards  both budget
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deficit  reduction  and  economic  growth.  Questions  of  fiscal  policy  are  dealt  with  in
another article of this special issue,16 and so are left aside here. Let it simply be noted
that, according to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), the deficit, as measured by the
public sector net borrowing, excluding public sector banks, was cut from £153.5 billion in
2009-2010 to £87.3 billion in 2014-2015. In terms of a percentage of GDP, the deficit was
reduced, from 10.2% in 2009-2010 to 4.8% in 2014-2015. The latter figure, released on 23
April 2015,17 helped the outgoing government claim that their tough fiscal discipline had
halved the deficit. Their message, however, ignored the role of the low interest rates paid
on government debt, the slow rise in tax receipts recorded since the end of 2012, and the
fact that GDP itself had grown.
10 On a quarter-to-quarter basis, after four quarters of encouraging recovery, GDP growth
remained stuck in stagnation, or even in decline, from the election of 2010 until the first
quarter  of  2013.  It  indeed  showed  a  steady  rate  after  Osborne’s  announcement  of
monetary activism intensification. In the end, after five years of Coalition government,
GDP growth had fallen, from an annual rate of 1.3% in 2010 down to 0.7% in 2011 and 0.2%
in 2012, before recovering to 1.7% in 2013 and 2.8% in 2014. The latter GDP growth figure,
happily revised up by 0.2 percentage point from previous estimates, was revealed towards
the end of the general election campaign, on 31 March 2015. Unsurprisingly, Osborne
rejoiced and boasted about the effectiveness of his economic plan, posting the following
Tweet straight away: “Hat trick of good news just out from ONS: GDP revised up, consumer
confidence up, living standards up. #LongTermEconomicPlan working.”18 Indeed, that same day,
the media relayed the ONS figures that GDP per head and household consumption had
increased by 4.8% and 3% respectively since 2010. Moreover, household consumption did
not seem fuelled by credit, as the ratio of household debt to GDP fell by one percentage
point, to 93 per cent, in the last quarter of 2014. Yet, critics argued that GDP growth was
depending too much on consumer spending, while the latter was depending too much on
exceptionally low inflation which needed to rise back to the official 2% target.
11 As it was, inflation had dramatically decreased. After a peak at 4.48% in 2011, up from
3.29% in 2010, inflation had gradually diminished to 2.83% in 2012, 2.56% in 2013 and
1.46% in 2014.  Monthly inflation on a  yearly basis  in fact  had slumped below 1% in
November 2014, to reach 0% in February 2015, before becoming negative in March 2015,
at -0.08%. Even though inflation thus strongly departed from the Treasury’s 2% target,
the news of zero inflation was not unwelcome for the government. This was because the
decline was accounted for by temporary decreasing oil prices, while the probability of
damaging structural deflation was rejected. For example,  when the ONS published an
inflation figure at 0.5% for December 2014, Cameron declared it was “fundamentally good
news”19 and Osborne proposed to “celebrate [the] effects of  low inflation,  not fear them”.20
Indeed, low inflation meant real family incomes increased. It was all the more true since,
as long as inflation predictions were not alarming, the Bank of England’s base rate would
be kept at its 0.5% low. And this low had eventually influenced the average interest rates
that households were offered by commercial banks, which decreased from 2.98% to 2.51%
between September 2012 and September 2014.21 
12 Unemployment had decreased too, following the same general trend as that of inflation: a
peak  at  8.1% of  the  active  population  in  2011,  up  from 7.8% in  2010,  then  gradual
reductions to 7.9% in 2012, 7.6% in 2013 and 6.1% in 2014.22 On a quarterly basis, the
unemployment rate had fallen below 7% in February 2014, and below 6% in November
2014. It actually went down further to 5.5% in March and April 2015,23 but these figures
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were not officially known at the time of the campaign as they were released on 13 May
2015.
13 There were still dark areas in all the fields described above, though. In money terms, the
deficit had only been reduced by 1.75%. Moreover, since the 2010 general election, public
borrowing had amounted to more than £550 billion, that is to say £100 billion more than
the amount New Labour had borrowed in 13 years. There was also the issue of the current
account (the difference between the income paid to, and received from, the rest of the
world),  which showed a £97.9 billion deficit in 2014. At 5.5% of national income, this
deficit was the highest recorded in history. Further historical comparisons show that GDP
per head was 1.2% below its 2008 peak. Moreover, its average growth failed to reach all
social classes throughout the country. Among employed people, five million workers were
in low-paid jobs and 700,000 had accepted zero-hour contracts that did not provide them
with  sufficient  income.  Wages  had  been  slow to  increase  too,  until  March  2014.  All
employee  weekly  earning  growth  had  remained  below  2.25%  annually  since  2009,
reaching striking lows of 0.4% in 2011 and 0.1% in 2014, even if persons in continuous
employment had pay rises of 3.5-4%.24 Until inflation disappeared altogether, real wage
growth was negative, around -2.5%, from the first quarter of 2010.25 Only since March
2014 could the British rejoice about a timid real pay rise.26 Furthermore, zero inflation,
when experienced, did not mean all prices remained stable. The annual inflation rate for
house prices increased from 7.3% in 2010 to 10% in 2014.27 Even food prices increased: the
20 most popular branded grocery prices apparently rising by 12% between 2010 and 2015.
28 As proof of spreading poverty under the Coalition government, the number of food
banks  had  soared  by  537%,  to  421  outlets,  while  the  number  of  people  using  them
increased by 163%, to 900,000.
14 There could of course be a lot more to say about the details of the United Kingdom’s 2015
economic situation. But what must be remembered is that,  on the whole and despite
resilient inequality and poverty, the country appeared to be in a far better economic
situation in the spring of 2015 than it had been at the election of 2010. Unsurprisingly, the
Conservatives made the most of this in their general election campaign.
 
The Choice of the Economy as the Main Theme for the
Conservatives’ Campaign
15 The broad topic of “the economy” dominated the national 2015 general election campaign.
A study made by Loughborough University reveals the economy remained the second of
all issues, and the first substantive matter covered by the press and television in the run
up to the elections, as shown in Table 1 below.
16 Table 1 – Top 10 TV and press election news coverage issues(1)
Issues 
30  March–  7
May
30  March–  8
April
9  April–  15
April
16  April–  22
April
23  April–  29
April
Election process 1 1 1 1 1
Economy 2 2 2 2 2
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Taxation 3 3 3 8 4
Constitutional issues 4 9 12 3 3
Employment 5 4 11 9 9
NHS 6 7 6 5 13
Immigration/
Migrants/ Race 
7 8 9 4 7
Europe 8 5 15 7 10
Business 9 6 13 14 8
Social security 10 10 17 11 10
17 (1)  Main  issues  in  election  news  coverage  in  TV  and  press  coverage  produced  on
weekdays (i.e. Monday to Friday inclusive). TV = Channel 4 News (7pm), Channel 5 News
(6.30pm), BBC1 News at 10, ITV1 News at 10, BBC2 Newsnight, Sky News 8-8.30pm; Press =
The Guardian, Independent, Times, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail,  Daily Express, Mirror,
Sun, Star and Metro.
18 Sources: Loughborough University Communication Research Centre, Media Coverage of the
2015 General Election Campaign, Reports, n°1-5, 13 April 2015, 18 April 2015, 24 April 2015, 1
May 2015, 11 May 2015.
19 In fact,  the political  commentators faithfully followed the Conservatives’  lead on the
subject. In 2010, the Conservatives’ general election campaign had failed to fully exploit
the idea of New Labour’s economic incompetence in both preventing and eliminating the
financial and economic crises. As a result, the Conservatives had fallen 20 seats short of
an overall majority at the House of Commons and had had to form a coalition with the
Liberal-Democrats.  In  2015,  the  mistake  of  a  disappointing  campaign  was  not  to  be
repeated. As of 2012, the Conservatives therefore renewed their contract with one of the
best election strategists of the time: Australian Lynton Crosby. Crosby had not managed
to lead the Conservatives to power at the 2005 general election. Yet, he remained famous
for his past success in Australia,  since he had actively contributed to the election of
Liberal Prime Minister John Howard four times in a row, from 1996 to 2004. In Britain, he
had  recently  regained  his  reputation,  when  helping  Boris  Johnson  to  be  repeatedly
elected as Mayor of London, in 2008 and 2012.
20 Crosby is known for getting straight to the point. When called for the 2015 campaign
preparation, he was reported to have told David Cameron to “scrape the barnacles off the
boat”29 and rather focus on the issues that mattered to the real citizens. Before and during
the campaign, the top three concerns of the British were the NHS, immigration, and the
economy, as shown in the various Economist/Ipsos MORI polls conducted at the time and
summed up in Table 2 below. The macroeconomic state of the United Kingdom was not at
the top of the population’s concerns, a fact that clearly transpired during the televised
debates,  when the audience was offered the chance to put  questions to the political
leaders.30 The British ordinary citizen was much more keen to know about every-day-life
issues like help to the elderly, the disabled, the sick and children.
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21 Table 2 – Top 10 most important issues facing Britain today


































22 Sources:  Economist/Ipsos-MORI,  Issues Index 2014 aggregate data,  14 January 2015;  Issues
Facing Britain (Issues Index), January 2015, February 2015, March 2015, April 2015.
23 As a matter of fact, Healthcare/NHS/Hospitals remained the first issue the public quoted,
in January and March 2015, when asked about what would help them decide which party
to vote for.31 But the NHS,  like immigration,  was a field in which the Conservatives’
records and proposals  were very likely to be criticized.32 With the prospect  of  being
attacked  by  the  Labour  Party  on  the  NHS,  as  was  indeed the  case  in  the  very  first
campaign poster of the opposition party,33 and by UKIP over immigration, it was a better
strategy for the Conservatives to shift the attention towards their economic strengths.
 
The Details of the Conservatives’ Economic Litany
24 Consequently, in January 2015, the first Conservative campaign poster paved the way for
a battle  focused on the economy.  The poster,  which showed an upward road slicing
through two flourishing crop fields and leading to a clearing in green forest in the
background, proposed to “[...] stay on the road to a stronger economy”. Under the inviting
positive  slogan,  the  Conservatives  listed  the  following  economic  achievements:  “1.75
million more people in work. 760,000 more businesses. The deficit halved.”34 These were three of
the four recurring achievements put forward throughout the Conservatives’ campaign.
Cameron added that of “the fastest growing economy of any major Western economy”35 during
the  televised  interview led  by  Jeremy  Paxman on  26  March  2015.  The  message  was
positive, concise but accurate, easy to remember and to quickly drop during any televised
interview, and easily understandable by the public. As it turned out, zero inflation also
happened to be mentioned, but was not part of the Conservatives’ preferred litany.
25 After  Parliament  was  dissolved,  on  30  March  2015,  Cameron  went  on  directing  the
national debate towards the economy, as he dedicated more than 60% of his 10 Downing
Street  statement  to  economic  issues.  His  statement  laid  the  four  pillars  of  the
Conservative Party’s campaign: the desperate situation inherited five years before, the
government’s achievements (with references to the four achievements mentioned above),
the  Conservatives’  programme  for  the  next  five  years,  and  the  Labour  Party’s
economically destructive plan. The speech enclosed the two main phrases to be attached
to the Labour Party. The past record of New Labour was summed up in the expression “
Britain  [...]  on  the  brink”,  to  qualify  the  2010  economic  situation;  the  possible  future
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performance of Ed Miliband was anticipated as “economic chaos”.36 It is worth noticing
that  in this  speech,  the NHS was hardly mentioned,  with just  a  reference stating its
financing and improvement depended on a growing economy that only the Conservatives
could secure. Immigration was ignored altogether.
26 From then on, the Conservatives’ campaign sounded like a variation on the same theme.
We will only take two more striking examples, to be compared to the excerpts quoted
above. At the live televised debate gathering the seven main party leaders on 2 April 2015,
Cameron started his opening statement saying:
Five years ago, this country was on the brink. [...]  we’ve been working with the
British  people  through  a  long-term  economic  plan.  And  that  plan  is  working.
There’re almost two million more people in work.  It’s  a balanced plan so we’ve
invested in our NHS as well  as reducing the deficit  [...].  And the plan’s working
because last year, we had the fastest growing economy of any of the major Western
countries [...].37
27 And he closed his statement in this way:
[...] I’ve tried to have one task in mind above all others and that has been turning
our economy around,  putting the country back to work [...].  We’ve created two
million jobs. Let’s create a job for everyone who wants and needs one. We’ve cut the
deficit in half. Let’s clear it altogether [...].38
28 Thirteen  days later  on  BBC  One,  when  asked  about  what  grade  he  would  give  his
government’s records, Cameron answered:
What I’ve tried to do [...] is [...] to turn the economy around, and two million more
people in work, 750 000 more businesses operating in Britain, growing faster than
the other major Western countries, I think that’s a strong record [...]. We got two
million more people in work, now let’s get full employment. We cut the deficit in
half as a share of GDP, let’s now get rid of it altogether. [...] stick to the plan and
build on it.39
29 As can be seen, Cameron’s economic message that was delivered to the general public via
popular media was very repetitive. Some political commentators went so far as to remark
that its litany nature even led to a loss of effectiveness.40 To be fair, the out-going Prime
Minister sometimes complemented the campaign’s simplified message with some details
about his government’s economic achievements. For example, when questioned about the
job  creation  benefiting  foreign  nationals,  Cameron  argued  that  the  proportion  had
slumped from 90% in 2010 to two-thirds in 2015. He even added that 80% of the jobs
created were full-time jobs.41 But on the whole, Cameron stuck to the slogans. Details and
explanations were left to Conservative junior political figures,  who had more time to
express  themselves  during  debates  about  specific  questions.  For  example,  when
Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury Priti Patel was invited to debate against Shabana
Mahmood, the shadow Exchequer Secretary, about employment, she specified that three-
fifths of the jobs that had been created over the last five years were highly skilled jobs
and only 2% were zero-hour contracts.42 Yet, it is not unreasonable to believe that Priti
Patel,  like any other Conservative junior political  figure,  had probably less chance to
reach the general public than Cameron or Osborne expressing themselves on the main
television channels.
30 Moreover, if the recurring simple economic message was sometimes complemented with
details  about  the nature of  the government’s  economic  achievements,  it  was  seldom
accompanied by explanations about the methods and means that had been implemented.
When  explanations  were  given,  they  concerned  only  the  achievements  of  deficit
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reduction  and  job  creation.  First,  about  the  deficit  reduction,  Cameron  repeatedly
referred to the “difficult decisions” his government had taken. Yet, he cautiously avoided
going into any detail. For example, he proudly declared that the government had “saved
20 billion in welfare over the last Parliament”,43 but did not take the risk of marking out some
unpopular saving measures. Second, to explain job creation, Cameron enumerated the
improvements made to the education system, the training of apprentices, and the reform
of the welfare system.44 He was also heard saying: “It is only with a strong economy that we
can achieve the things that we dream of: jobs, and homes, and livelihoods for more people.”45 This
meant that good macroeconomic conditions were indeed the key to success. Yet Cameron
did not elaborate on these conditions. Moreover, he never precisely explained how his
government had realized the two achievements of economic growth and low inflation. His
only hint of an explanation was the recurring reference to the “long-term economic plan”.
But the details  of  this  three-part  plan were not explicitly recalled.  When some were
alluded to, they did not concern the monetary activism part of the plan. Rather, they
were related to the credible fiscal policy part, as seen above, and also to the supply side
reform part with, for example, the mention of the Help-to-Buy scheme that had made
house purchase more affordable.46
 
Monetary Policy Issues in George Osborne’s
Messages
31 The fact that the Prime Minister never made any reference to the monetary activism
implemented by his outgoing government might lead to the hypothesis that the subject of
monetary policy was the prerogative of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But Osborne was
not the Conservatives’ leading campaign figure. As the designer and presenter of fiscal
austerity measures, he was not very popular. In March 2015, only 43% of poll respondents
said they were satisfied with the way Osborne had done his job.47 In light of this lack of
popularity, it was better for the Conservatives to let Cameron occupy centre stage.
32 Table 3 – Ranking of the main political figures’ media appearances(1)
 
30  March–  7
May
30  March–  8
April
9  April–  15
April
16  April–  22
April




1 1 1 2 1
Ed Miliband 2 2 2 1 2
Nick Clegg 3 3 3 5 5
Nicola
Sturgeon
4 6 7 3 3
Nigel Farage 5 4 5 4 4
George
Osborne
6 5 4 15 6(2)
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12 20 9 10 11
Leanne Wood 17 10 -(3) 10 -
33 (1) Ranks according to the percentage of appearances of a political figure as a proportion
of the total number of media coverage items analysed. Items produced in TV and press
coverage on weekdays (see note (1), Table 1, supra).
34 (2) Position shared with Boris Johnson.
35 (3) Dropped out of the top 20.
36 Sources: Loughborough University Communication Research Centre, Media Coverage of the
2015 General Election Campaign, op. cit.
37 As can be seen in Table 3 above, Osborne was indeed not in the top five of the main
political figures appearing in the media, even if he did far better than the leaders of two
of the main political parties in the United Kingdom, Natalie Bennett (the Green Party),
and Leanne Wood (Welsh Plaid Cymru). When he physically appeared in the media while
campaigning, he was usually staged so as to look like the “nice guy” close to British
industry and workers. This is what could be seen, for example, in the BBC electronic site
daily  section  called  “Election  2015  In  Pictures”,  which  exhibited  242  pictures  of  the
campaign taken from 30 March to 6 May 2015. Of the nine pictures in which Osborne was
present, three showed him paying an interested visit to a British company and two even
participating in the activity, making pizzas at Pizza Express and changing oil on a car at
Hawkins Motor Group garage.  In the other four pictures,  he just  stood with another
public  figure.48 The  Conservatives’  staging  of  Osborne  as  “working  Britain’s  friend”
appears  even  more  obvious  in  The  Telegraph’s  electronic  64  picture  book  of  the
Conservatives’ campaign. In the selection of 13 pictures representing Osborne, 11 were
snapshots of the Chancellor actively visiting a company or a working site.49
38 This article is not the place to review all the pictures taken of the Chancellor campaigning
for the 2015 general election. There were many others. Yet, it is worth noting that no
picture could be found that purposefully evoked the outgoing government’s success in
monetary activism. The author’s search for pictures of Osborne in front of the Bank of
England  or  with  Mark  Carney,  for  example,  remained  fruitless.  As  a  matter  of  fact,
pictures of the pair are not numerous on the Internet. Google displays only fewer than a
dozen of different ones, some of them taken at the same event, either from May 2013 to
August 2014, or from May 2015.
39 A Search for reported statements did not bring better findings. Nowhere was Osborne
reported to have acknowledged publicly the positive role of monetary policy in achieving
the economic growth that the Conservatives were promoting during the general election
campaign. Yet, two annual events could have given Osborne this opportunity during the
campaign: the Budget and the remit to the Governor of the Bank of England, which were
presented and sent on 18 March 2015. It was, in fact, hardly the case, as we will see now.
40 The Chancellor opened his Budget speech with the idea that Britain was growing and,
faithful  to  the  campaign  strategy,  recounted  the government’s  various  economic
achievements  seen above,  just  adding that  of  the replacement  of  bank bail-outs  and
nationalizations by the profitable sale of bank shares back to the private sector. He then
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linked the achievements to the British long-term economic plan, but did not go back to
the three components of the plan. When speaking about employment, he actually said the
plan was “based on the premise that if you provide[d] economic stability [...] then you w[ould]
create  jobs  too”.  He  thus  reckoned  economic  stability  was  the  main  root  of  the
government’s economic success, but he did not mention how this stability was achieved.
And when he more specifically covered monetary policy, Osborne just factually explained
the inflation level and announced the future policy as regards gilts and long-term interest
rates.50 The part of the speech dedicated to monetary policy therefore remained very
neutral.
41 The letter to the Governor of the Bank of England, that Osborne wrote to introduce the
remit, was not more promotional, as it remained focused on regulatory aspects. Indeed,
the  objective  of  the  letter  and  the  remit  is  to  establish  technically  the  monetary
framework. The documents do not contain any evaluation of the economic situation of
the country or of the results of monetary policy. In March 2015, they therefore consisted
in reaffirming the framework, assessing the progress of the reform and announcing the
next steps of the latter.51 If,  in the rosy circumstances of good GDP growth for 2014,
Osborne took the opportunity to acknowledge the effectiveness of the monetary policy
and pay tribute to Carney and the Bank of England’s work, it remained off the media
record.
42 Last,  the  author  found no  evidence in  media  reporting  of  the  campaign of  Osborne
explaining economic growth by the effectiveness  of  his  government’s  2013 monetary
policy reform. Similarly, no evidence was found of Osborne explaining economic growth
by anything more than the “long-term economic plan” litany. Nevertheless, the Chancellor
was heard to say that the years of economic growth should be used by the government to
reduce its deficit so as to create the economic stability necessary for business investment
and job creation.52 That was similar to Cameron’s reference to a strong economy being the
necessary condition to any broader political achievement. But how this strong economy
had indeed materialised was never precisely recalled.
 
The Conservatives’ Reasons for De-Politicizing the
Monetary Policy
43 The fact that the Conservatives did not allude to their monetary policy reform, while
hammering home their economic achievements tirelessly, in their popular campaign that
targeted ordinary citizens, contrasts quite clearly with the stance of re-politicizing the
monetary  policy  which  surrounded  the  reforms  implemented  in  2013.  In  fact,  the
Conservatives’ attitude amounted to de-politicizing monetary policy to its extreme limits.
Indeed,  not  only  did  the  outgoing  government  relinquish  any  link  to,  and thus  any
accountability for, monetary policy and its possible results, but they removed the issue
from the political debate. There might be several reasons for this strategy.
44 The first reason is purely economic and stems from the fact that the actual influence of
the outgoing government’s monetary policy actions on the United Kingdom’s growth is
difficult  to measure.  There is  an economists’  consensus about  the fact  that  the 2010
recession, as measured by GDP negative growth, would have been even worse without the
first wave of quantitative easing (QE1), implemented by New Labour.53 But the impact on
growth of the Conservatives’ further QE2 and QE3 has remained uncertain. The same is
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true for the effects that the FLS and Help-to-Buy scheme may have had on the level of
lending while,  at the same time, the schemes have been suspected of contributing to
demand-led housing price inflation.54 The only actual economic success seems to have
come from forward guidance.  In November 2014,  Carney remarked that the markets’
expectations that the Bank of England’s interest rate would rise “to a more limited extent
and at a more gradual pace” 55 had led to a decrease in the rates offered to households and
businesses. This could only have had positive effects on growth. But if forward guidance
had met with economic success, it was not well understood by the general public.
45 Forward guidance really started on 7 August 2013 when the MPC announced that interest
rates would not be raised as long as the unemployment rate did not fall to 7%. This policy
was meaningful as it rested on data everyone understood. But then, in February 2014, as
the  unemployment  rate  approached  the  threshold,  the  MPC changed  its  message.  It
established Forward Guidance II, which linked the base rate future rises to the level of
absorption of the economy’s spare capacity. The absence of immediate interest rate rises
was rather good news. But the side effect was that monetary policy lost credibility in the
eyes of the ordinary citizen because first, the MPC seemed to have suddenly changed its
mind and, second, it had replaced its message by something far more obscure. It meant
that, even if in purely economic terms, Osborne’s 2013 monetary reform seemed to have
delivered, this achievement was inoperable as a campaign argument, because of people’s
misunderstanding of the ways forward guidance had been rolled out by the MPC.
46 By contrast,  low inflation and low interest rates were two economic facts,  related to
monetary policy, that were grasped by all. But inflation was far too low as regards the
target of 2% confirmed year after year in the Treasury’s remit to the Bank of England.
Since the Bank of England Act of 1998 requires the Governor to write to the Chancellor
when the actual  inflation rate departs from the target by more than one percentage
point, Carney had written an open letter to Osborne on 12 February 2015. He had placed
most of the responsibility for undershooting the target on oil and energy price decreases,
and put much emphasis on the temporary aspect of  this deviation from the target.56
Osborne had accepted the explanations straight away. Yet, there was a risk that not only
the MPC’s operational effectiveness, but also the Treasury’s designing competence, might
be  called  into  question.  Indeed,  the  government  had  paradoxically  welcomed  the
transgression of their own directives in December 2014, as we have seen,57 and this had
encouraged unsettling speculations about whether it was not time to change the nature
of the target altogether.58 It was therefore preferable for the outgoing Treasury team not
to insist too much on the subject of low inflation, that they were not fully responsible for,
anyway.
47 As for low interest rates, they were the results of the MPC’s autonomous operations. The
outgoing government could not claim credit for them. More than that they should not do
so, because it would compromise the central bank’s independence. In the summer of 2014,
Conservative Member of Parliament Mark Field had already accused Carney of having a “
clear bargain” with Osborne not to raise interest rates before the election. Labour Treasury
Committee member John Mann had followed suit, declaring that it was “abundantly clear
that Mark Carney [was] attempting to delay interest rate increases until after the election when
they [would] rise immediately”59 which, in the end, has not proved true. Another Labour
member of the Treasury Committee, Teresa Pearce, had also suggested that the Bank of
England was not “free of political interference”.60 Not only were such accusations likely to
undermine the whole British monetary policy framework,  but in election times,  they
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might also question the outgoing government’s integrity. Carney had quickly managed to
silence gossip, but during the general election campaign, the Conservatives could not
take the risk of soliciting criticism by showing any complicity with the Governor.  As
regards interest rates, the best stance to adopt would have been to congratulate the MPC
for  its  effectiveness.  But  that  would  have  implied  blurring  the  message  that  the
government’s long-term economic plan was working, since the credit of economic growth
would thus have been shared with a third party. The Conservatives already had to make
the electorate forget that, over the last five years, they had led a Coalition government.
Indeed, while the Conservatives claimed they had not been able to achieve all that they
wanted to because of the Coalition,61 the Liberal Democrats were more than ready to try
to step into the limelight. For example, as regards economic growth, Liberal Democrat
Treasury Minister Danny Alexander was reported as saying that his party had been the “
rock of stability on which [the] recovery had taken root.”62
 
Conclusion
48 The  contrast  between  the  United  Kingdom’s  economic  turmoil,  in  which  the
Conservative-Lib-Dem government was formed in 2010, and the comparative prosperity
recorded in 2015 represented the main general election asset of the Conservatives. It was
therefore chosen as the primary issue of the party’s campaign – even though the public
was more concerned with the themes of the NHS and immigration. The strategy seems to
have worked since, against all predictions and polls, the Conservatives won a majority of
seats in the House of Commons and formed the first Conservative government since 1997.
49 Regarding the economy, the strategy that the Conservatives deployed to defend their
economic competence was the litany-like use of a limited number of repetitive short
soundbites, which symbolised the principal economic achievements of the government.
With the predominance of this litany, there was hardly any room for explanations about
the ways and means used to reach these achievements, and absolutely no mention of the
government’s monetary policy actions.
50 The truth is that the exact impact of this policy is not easily measurable, except for the
reform consisting in the introduction of forward guidance. Yet while forward guidance
appears to have been effective economically, its dynamic implementation, evolving with
conditions, undermined its credibility in the eyes of the public, and so prevented its use
as a campaign argument. What was clear to the public was historically low inflation and
interest rates, which were both the results of the independent operations of the Bank of
England. It seemed more dangerous than anything else to try and claim credit for the
former, as zero inflation was too much of a deviation from the symmetric inflation target.
As for the latter, it had already been exploited by MPs to accuse Mark Carney of electoral
collusion with George Osborne.
51 Eventually, the way the Conservatives dealt – or did not deal – with monetary policy
during  the  general  election  campaign  corresponds  to  a  move  to  renewed  de-
politicization, which contrasted with that of re-politicization observed in 2013. In the
end,  the  Conservatives  denying  themselves  the  use  of  monetary  policy  for  electoral
purposes tends to prove the robustness of the monetary policy framework, based on the
operational  independence of  the Bank of  England.  The shift  in focus  from monetary
policy to fiscal and supply side measures also suggests the latter might have regained
potency in the generation of growth.
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ABSTRACTS
The  relative  prosperity  of  Britain  in  2015  represented  the  main  asset  around  which  the
Conservatives built their general election campaign. The strategy that they deployed was the
repetition of a litany of their principal economic achievements, in which no mention was made
to the government’s monetary policy actions. The fact that the outgoing government did not use
the possible success of the last five years’ monetary policy as a campaign argument contrasted
with the re-politicization of monetary policy that had accompanied the introduction of forward
guidance in Britain in 2013. It can be explained by the difficulty of assessing the exact effect of
monetary policy on the recovery, the loss of credibility encountered by forward guidance as it
was modified according to  economic conditions,  and the robustness  of  the framework itself,
which is based on the Bank of England’s independence.
La prospérité relative de la Grande-Bretagne en 2015 a représenté l’atout majeur autour duquel
les Conservateurs ont bâti leur campagne électorale. La stratégie qu’ils ont déployée a consisté à
répéter une litanie de leurs principales réussites économiques, dans laquelle ils ont passé leur
politique monétaire sous silence. Le fait que le gouvernement sortant n’a pas utilisé les succès
probables de la politique monétaire de ces cinq dernières années comme argument de campagne
contraste  avec  la  re-politisation  de  la  politique  monétaire  qui  a  accompagné  l’introduction
d’indications  sur  la  trajectoire  future  des  taux  d'intérêt  directeurs  (forward  guidance)  au
Royaume-Uni en 2013. Il peut être expliquée par la difficulté à évaluer l’effet exact de la politique
monétaire  sur  la  reprise  économique,  la  perte  de  crédibilité  encourue  par  la  stratégie  de
communication de la Banque d’Angleterre et la robustesse du cadre de politique monétaire lui-
même.
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